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ABSTRACT This paper deals with the impact of self-help groups (SHGs) in apple
production on empowering women in the Chencha district of Southern Ethiopia. Impact
is traced on the basis of a cross-sectional survey among SHG members and
nonmembers, using propensity score matching. Apart from the attitudinal changes
among SHG and non-SHG women, we also scrutinize differences in male attitudes
concerning the status of women. The results point towards positive and signiﬁcant
impacts of SHG participation on empowerment at the community level, which suggests
that SHGs offer an effective space for women to share information and raise awareness
about their rights. This could in turn be harnessed collectively to negotiate more “room
to maneuver” in the community. At the same time, however, the data hint at negative
effects from group participation at the household level. The attitudinal differences
between treatment and control group indicate more conﬂictive relations between
spouses, arguably due to an intensiﬁed ﬁght to assert control over household resources.
Hence, the evidence is consistent with a potential “backlash effect” from husbands.
KEYWORDS: Women empowerment, Self-help groups, Bargaining power, Male backlash,
Impact evaluation, Apple cultivation, Ethiopia
1. Introduction
It is estimated that close to 200 million people across the developing world have found their
way into a self-help group (SHG) by 2017 (Greaney, Kaboski, and Van Leemput 2016). In
majority, these SHG members are women, as the SHG model is believed to be particularly
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appropriate for working towards women empowerment based on the idea that collective
action is most effective in ﬁghting patriarchy. Recently, Brody et al. (2017) have released
the ﬁrst systematic review of the impacts of SHGs on various dimensions of women
empowerment, taking in 23 quantitative impact studies and 11 qualitative ones. With the
exception of the psychological dimension, the study reports positive impacts. At the
same time, it signals the following: “[T]he included evaluations often did not include sufﬁ-
cient information about the speciﬁcs of the activities that were implemented by the SHGs.
As a result, it remains unclear which of the various SHG models are most effective” (15).
Indeed, the SHGmodel is far from uniform and can be focused on mutual support among its
voluntary members in the economic, social, legal, or political domain. In this paper, like
Brody et al. (2017), we zoom in on SHGs that have a strong economic component, more
speciﬁcally SHGs that engage in collective income generation. In a sense, this is a more
challenging but potentially also more transformative venture than the model prioritizing
collective access to ﬁnance, i.e., the well-known credit and savings groups.
Even within SHGs that set up a joint economic activity, several types emerge, which are
related to the nature of the enterprise. In many cases, women SHGs take up an activity that
is new to them, such as beekeeping, the cultivation of a new cash crop, or further processing
of food items that are locally cultivated. In other instances, women group together around
economic activities in which they have ample experience, often ﬁrmly positioned in the
female domain, such as subsistence crop cultivation or weaving. The case that we deal
with in this paper presents yet another type. We study an SHG scheme in the Ethiopian
highlands where women have started apple growing as a joint economic strategy on land
allocated to the group. However, this cash crop is not new to them, as the members also
engage in apple cultivation in their own household, where it is typically a family enterprise
rather than an activity reserved for women. At the household level, both spouses (and often
the children as well) perform tasks related to the cultivation of apple fruits and seedlings.
This rather unique feature makes it interesting to explore the impacts of SHG membership
on women’s status in the household and the wider community, as women-only apple pro-
duction may disrupt the tacit norms that likely have evolved in households as to the entitle-
ments that ﬂow from commercial apple cultivation for men and women. Intra-household
dynamics, in particular the relative bargaining power of husband and wife, may need reca-
libration as a consequence.
An additional reason for selecting this Ethiopian case study is the relative paucity of
impact studies of SHGs in a sub-Sahara African context. Overwhelmingly, the evidence
concerns SHG schemes in South Asia, most notably in India and Bangladesh, which reﬂects
the fact that SHGs have grown out of the microcredit revolution, which has its origin in the
region. While roughly half of all SHG members worldwide are believed to participate in an
Indian scheme, the model has been replicated elsewhere, including sub-Sahara Africa. The
Ethiopian government, for example, has promoted SHG schemes already since 2002, along
other initiatives to redress gender inequalities. Their degree of success, however, is not as
well documented as those schemes that operate in a South Asian context. By illustration, the
systematic review by Brody et al. (2017) covers 34 impact studies, only 3 of which concern
African schemes. While improving women’s status in South Asia is admittedly very critical,
levels of gender inequality across parts of sub-Sahara Africa remain persistently high. In
fact, both Bangladesh and India outrank Ethiopia on the Gender Inequality Index, as
reported in the 2016 Human Development Report (UNDP 2016).
Since the SHG scheme under study in this paper is one that is involved in agriculture, it is
pertinent to point out the disadvantageous position of women in agriculture, which is well
documented for sub-Sahara Africa. Female farmers lose out due to the male-dominated
nature of the extension service in most countries, a lack of access to credit and improved
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inputs, absence or insecurity of property rights on land, and poor market access (Quisumb-
ing and Pandolfelli 2010). In addition, community norms and weak intra-household bar-
gaining power may restrict crop choice to women, prescribe allocation of marginal lands,
and exclude women from commercialization, negatively affecting productivity, spending
power, and psychological traits like self-esteem (Fischer and Qaim 2012; BenYishay
et al. 2016). In Ethiopia, the government has taken action to tackle these gender-based
injustices by enshrining gender equality in property and inheritance rights in the Ethiopian
constitution (in 1994) and pursued subsequent legislative changes and land titling programs
requiring property titles to have both the name of husband and wife. While these policies
have been effective in promoting women’s land rights in some parts of the country
(Lavers 2017), the reality on the ground is often different, as is the case in the Chencha dis-
trict in the south of the country, where our research is located. In this context, we aim to
assess whether women SHG members have been able to challenge such power imbalances,
at least according to their own perceptions and that of their husbands. To this purpose, a
cross-section of 94 SHG members was surveyed along with their spouses in 2013, i.e.,
about 3 years into the program. For the identiﬁcation of average treatment effects, 98
couples were surveyed in adjacent subdistricts where no SHGs were initiated and these
control couples were subsequently matched to the exposed couples using propensity
scores. This is admittedly a “second-best” design, as a panel design would allow for stron-
ger causal identiﬁcation. Propensity score matching (PSM) is only effective in dealing with
selection bias concerning SHG participation caused by observable factors, leaving unobser-
vable sources of bias uncontrolled (Gertler et al. 2016, 147). While we provide an indication
of the sensitivity of our results to changes in unobservables, the paper is deliberately cau-
tious in its claims on causality, given the limitations of the design.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy review the concept of
women empowerment and its link to collective action. Subsequently, Section 3 provides an
overview of the evidence collected so far on the impact of SHGs in relation to women
empowerment. In Section 4, more details are provided on the apple-cultivating SHGs
and the local context of Chencha, followed by a description of the sampling procedure
and impact identiﬁcation strategy in Section 5. The results from the statistical impact analy-
sis are presented in Section 6, which are subsequently interpreted in Section 7 in light of
additional qualitative information as well as the literature reviewed. Finally, Section 8
concludes.
2. Empowerment and Collective Action
Although the term empowerment is subject to various conceptualizations and interpret-
ations, Mosedale (2005) highlights four aspects about women empowerment that are
generally accepted. First, one can only meaningfully talk about empowerment, if the
starting point is one of disempowerment, or “to be denied choice” as Kabeer (1999)
puts it. Second, the empowerment process should be led by women themselves.
Other actors can only play a facilitating or supportive role. Third, empowerment does
not refer to decision-making power on trivial matters but concerns “strategic life
choices” (Kabeer 1999). Finally, empowerment is a process without a ﬁxed end goal;
it does not stop at a given point in time. Kabeer (1999, 435) provides a concise deﬁ-
nition of empowerment as a “process by which those who have been denied the
ability to make strategic life choices acquire such ability,” which nicely reﬂects the
four features mentioned above.
According to Batliwala (2007), the critical operating concept within empowerment is
power. Power can be taken as “the ability to make choices” (Kabeer 1999). By
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consequence, disempowerment then refers to “those disadvantaged by the way power
relations presently shape their choices, opportunities and well-being” (Mosedale 2005,
243). The choices women want to make and the opportunities they get are a function of
the power available to them. Therefore, according to Shefner-Rogers et al. (1998, 321),
“successful empowerment requires a shift in power relations.” That shift can be in the
social, political, and/or economic domain, both between individuals and across social
groups (Batliwala 2007). Therefore, the efforts of governments and other entities that
support women to achieve their goals have to go directed at correcting power relations
and opening up opportunities to exercise choice. The formation of groups is believed to
be one way to deal with such imbalances in power relations and bring better outcomes col-
lectively, or on an individual basis.
In the context of SHGs, it has become customary to distinguish between four different
types of power, based on Rowlands (1997, 13): “power over” (controlling power),
“power to” (productive power), “power with” (collective power) and “power within”
(psychological power). Pereznieto and Taylor (2014) have translated these concepts for
women’s empowerment in the economic domain speciﬁcally, which is pertinent for our
SHG case that concentrates on collective income generation. In this study, the focus is
on 1) “power to,” as referred to as “economic decision-making power within their house-
hold, community, and local economy”; 2) “power over,” which deals with “access to and
control over ﬁnancial, physical, and knowledge-based assets”; and 3) “power with,” i.e.,
the ability to organize with others to enhance economic activity and rights (ibid., 236).
The fourth type of “power within,” which reﬂects psychological traits like self-esteem,
self-efﬁcacy, and mental bandwidth, is less central for lack of data.
Policy-makers and aid practitioners have embraced the belief that groups are instru-
mental in generating such powers. Building social capital through group formation has
been used in communities worldwide, especially in rural areas, as a means for risk
reduction, income generation, and public service provision (Pandolfelli, Meinzen-Dick,
and Dohrn 2008). In most of the collective action initiatives, except microcredit, men
are dominant in terms of membership as well as in leadership positions (Fischer and
Qaim 2012). The establishment of gendered institutions like women-only microcredit
groups and SHGs may be viewed as an antidote to such male-dominated collective
action structures.
The literature provides mixed evidence about the impact of collective action on women
empowerment. On the one hand, collective action may beneﬁt the already well-off, thereby
entrenching the impoverishment of marginalized groups (see, e.g., Burra, Deshmukh-
Ranadive, and Murthy 2005). On the other hand, collective action has been found to
hold manifold beneﬁts that strengthen the position of women (Tesoriero 2006; Acharya
et al. 2007; Swain and Wallentin 2009; De Hoop et al. 2014). According to Bantilan and
Padmaja (2008), the social capital generated at the household and society level through col-
lective action is an important means by which women gain access to resources and econ-
omic opportunities to escape from poverty. There is also a large body of literature on
women’s collective action that evidences its contribution to natural resource management
and protection (Agarwal 2000; Panda 2007), which will not be discussed here. Although
many different operationalizations of women empowerment are available for empirical
work (see Narayan-Parker 2005 for an overview), most studies include aspects of intra-
household bargaining power and control over resources, often alongside social or political
indicators such as women’s degree of involvement in public life or physical freedom to
venture beyond the domestic sphere. While acknowledging recent critique by Fox and
Romero (2017) that women’s inﬂuence over household resources represents only “a very
narrow sliver of empowerment” and is a poor predictor of other empowerment dimensions,
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as corroborated by Bayissa, Smits, and Ruben (forthcoming) for urban SHGs in Ethiopia,
we also concentrate on such outcome measures, as it allows for comparing our results to
those of similar evaluations elsewhere.
3. Evidence of SHG Impacts on Women Empowerment
The meta-evaluation of Brody et al. (2017) distinguishes between six outcome domains:
economic empowerment, political empowerment, women’s mobility, women’s control
over family planning, psychological empowerment, and domestic violence. The overall
picture that emerges shows robust positive effects in the ﬁrst four domains, but no clear
effects on psychological empowerment and domestic violence. This conclusion is encoura-
ging in the sense that systematic perverse impacts from SHG participation were not
detected. The claim that “SHGs do not have adverse consequences for domestic violence”
(ibid., 1) is illustrative in this regard. Hence, the review does not lend support to the pres-
ence of a “male backlash effect,” which has been documented in several studies that evalu-
ate the consequences of women becoming more economically independent (e.g., Luke and
Munshi 2011 and Weitzman 2014, both papers concern India; Alesina, Brioschi, and Le
Ferrara 2016, on Africa).
It is conjectured that this “backlash” from men stems from the perceived threat that
their breadwinner status in the household will be eroded, which comes with the
specter of reduced status and self-respect. In extreme cases, this frustration could lead to
aggressive behavior towards the spouse (Weitzman 2014). The theory of “gender
deviance neutralization” suggests that men and women intensify traditionally gender-
based behaviors when couples deviate from the conventional pattern (ibid.). Greenstein
(2000) stresses in this respect that one’s relative share of resources rather than the absolute
share is predictive of relationship dynamics. Women’s resources relative to men’s may
increase the violence that women face, especially when their resources are perceived as
threatening.
However, the empirical evidence on male backlash is mixed. Other studies observe a
reduction in marital violence following an increase in women’s economic contribution,
mainly as a consequence of reduced exposure (working outside the home), such as Bhatta-
charyya, Bedi, and Chhachhi (2011) and Chin (2012), both on India, Kim et al. (2007) in
South Africa, and Peters (2017) in Bangladesh. Yet, other scholars ﬁnd effects that could
signal male backlash but interpret these differently. For example, Van Staveren and
Odebode (2007) observe that husbands in Nigeria tend to reduce the resources available
to the household when their spouse starts to earn her own income outside the family
business, but ascribe this to the interaction between a complex set of family norms about
“fair” contributions by spouses and male prerogatives, rather than as a retaliatory response.
The experimental study by Kebede et al. (2014), which ﬁnds that Ethiopian couples fail to
come close to Pareto efﬁciency in a voluntary contribution mechanism game, could also be
seen in this light, as it is argued that fairness considerations seem to drive their results.
Whether potential perverse impacts for women stem from male backlash, or, alternatively,
from adjustment in accordance to norms about fairness in a patriarchal context, the unitary
and cooperative household model, which both assume Pareto efﬁciency, should be
eschewed in this case and replaced by a noncooperative bargaining model.
In the remainder of this section, we highlight selected evaluation studies of SHG
schemes, most of which are also covered by the systematic review. In doing so, we dis-
tinguish between schemes in which microcredit provision is the central element and
those that focus on speciﬁc income-generating activities. We start with the studies that
have a strong link with microﬁnance.
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A study on microﬁnance by Swain and Wallentin (2009) showed a positive impact from
SHG membership on women empowerment in India. They used data from a nationally
representative quasi-experimental household survey from ﬁve states on a sample of 961
individuals to arrive at this result. The empowerment indicator used in the two time
periods (2000 and 2003) was composed of various dimensions, among which the
primary economic activity in which the woman is involved (as a proxy for income share
of the woman), whether she has experienced any kind of physical or emotional abuse
from the spouse, the level of awareness on women’s rights, whether she has independent
savings, and political participation.
A study that also ﬁnds unambiguous positive results is Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley
(1996) on rural credit programs offered by Grameen Bank and the Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC) in Bangladesh. On the basis of logistic regression on
a sample of 1300 women, the authors conclude that the involvement in these credit pro-
grams had a positive effect on women empowerment. They used a composite eight-dimen-
sional empowerment indicator, in addition to individual empowerment dimensions, as a
dependent variable. Participation increased the mobility of the women, their ability to
make purchases and major household decisions, their political and legal awareness, and
ownership of productive assets. The paper also suggests that vulnerability of women to
domestic violence declined due to the program. A more recent study by Mohapatra and
Sahoo (2016), not yet covered in the systematic review, also found that participation in
microﬁnance groups had a positive and signiﬁcant effect on women empowerment in
India. For identiﬁcation, they used PSM methods on a sample of 300 randomly selected
women (200 SHG participants and 100 nonparticipants). Their outcome variable is a com-
posite index of women empowerment computed from three dimensions (autonomy, econ-
omic empowerment, and quality of gender relationships).
More ambiguous results from a microﬁnance-oriented SHG scheme can be found in De
Hoop et al. (2014), which deal with the impact of women’s SHG membership in Odisha,
India, using a quasi-experimental design. The study found that there was a positive
impact of SHG membership on women’s autonomy, an important aspect of empowerment,
but this failed to translate into higher subjective well-being, at least among women in the
more conservative villages. In their interpretation, SHG membership engenders an identity
loss at the individual level through the violation of gender norms at the community level. If
the community holds strong sanctions against such norm transgression, or if women them-
selves have deeply internalized these norms, SHG participation compromises life satisfac-
tion. In a sub-Sahara African setting, Ganle, Afriyie, and Segbeﬁa (2015) assess the
empowerment effects of microcredit among rural women in Ghana. Using a qualitative
longitudinal study on women involved in an NGO-run microlending program, they
found that some women got more empowered due to their access to credit, while others
were further disempowered due to lack of control over the use of loans and due to an
inability to repay their loan. Hence, impacts also turned out to be heterogeneous, depending
on levels of intra-household bargaining power.
Apart from microcredit-oriented groups, there are also evaluations of SHGs that directly
focus on a speciﬁc economic activity, much like in our Ethiopian case. A study by Tesoriero
(2006), who reports on an evaluation of NGO-supported women SHGs in KV Kuppam
Block, Tamil Nadu, Southern India, falls in this category. The focus of the paper is on
their contribution to gender equality in terms of citizenship and empowerment rather
than to their success in managing microcredit loans. The participating women perceived
working collectively to have a positive inﬂuence on change at the village and panchayat
(block) level. The case study part showed that representing their village in local meetings
effectively allowed them to raise the problems of the community and was successful in the
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development of drinking water infrastructure, concrete roads, and free construction of
houses for the poor.
The mixed methods study by Acharya et al. (2007) that explores a community develop-
ment strategy to empower rural women through educational and small-scale household
economic activities in Nepal also showed positive impacts from SHG participation.
Using both qualitative and quantitative (correlation matrix) methods, they show that the
program reduced the gender gap in literacy, which had a spillover effect to other cognitive
skills through promoting the value of education to nonparticipant women. For those women
who used to be engaged in kitchen gardening activities before the intervention, these activi-
ties gained momentum after the intervention period of the program, despite some barriers
for further expansion like disease and pest occurrence, lack of seeds, lack of training, and
lack of water for irrigation. The paper by Shefner-Rogers et al. (1998) explores the role of
communication in the empowerment process of female dairy farmers in India. Measuring
empowerment on a 12-item scale and comparing dairy-producing women who participated
in training with a cooperative development program with nonparticipating female dairy
farmers, they found that the former were more empowered in a broad sense. Participants
scored higher on 11 of the 12 indicators used.
The study by Fischer and Qaim (2012), based on survey data from small-scale banana
producing farmers in Kenya, showed that group membership has a positive effect on
gender equality and female-controlled income share when women participate in mixed
groups. A related study in Ethiopia by Oumer, Tiruneh, and Tizale (2014) shows positive
impacts of women Farmers Research Group participation on improving knowledge and
skill on potato technology, collective capacity, and their beneﬁt from seed potato pro-
duction. For instance, the study indicated that the participating women farmers even
started to challenge formal institutions, demanding new technologies and solutions to con-
straints of agricultural production and marketing by writing an ofﬁcial letter with their own
stamp on it.
Methodologically, some of the studies used controlled groups and innovative identiﬁ-
cation strategies in evaluating the impact, while others looked at the qualitative aspect
using in-depth case studies. Despite these methodological differences, results overlap in
the sense that modest beneﬁts on various dimensions of women empowerment were
revealed, albeit with important qualiﬁers and an occasional dissenting study (most
notably the Ghanaian study by Ganle, Afriyie, and Segbeﬁa 2015).
4. Context and Data
Chencha is one of the 15 districts under the Gamo Gofa zone of the Southern Nations
Nationalities and People’s Regional State (SNNPRS) of Ethiopia and is in turn administra-
tively divided into 45 rural and 5 urban subdistricts. It is a relatively isolated highland area,
situated at an altitude ranging from 1600–3200 m above sea level, and predominantly popu-
lated by families belonging to the ethnic group of the Gamo. In terms of livelihood strat-
egies, the area is characterized by mixed-systems farming based on crop production and
livestock rearing. The cereals most commonly grown in the area are wheat and barley,
while beans and peas are the most popular leguminous crops. Potato and enset (false
banana) are the dominant root crops in the area. Concerning livestock ownership, cattle,
sheep, horses, mules, and chickens feature most prominently. According to a recent
study by Eshetu and Mekonnen (2016) on poverty in Chencha district and the adjacent
(low-land) district of Mirab Abaya, livestock ownership is an important predictor of
poverty. The same applies to land ownership. Using a poverty line of 250 Birr per adult
equivalent per month, the poverty rate is calculated to equal 30% of households (ibid.).
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Most households (84%) possess landholdings in the range of 0.1–0.5 ha only, which attests
to high population density. Land inheritance systems are strongly patrilineal among the
Gamo, which is rooted in the custom that young women become part of the groom’s
family after marriage (Bayu 2015). Daughters are effectively excluded from receiving
family plots. As Bayu (2015) reports from a focus group discussion with women who
raised the issue of female land rights, husbands proved unreceptive and felt their authority
was undermined, leading to frictions in marital relations.
Land is commercially exploited mainly for the production of apple fruit and seedling, as
alternative cash crops are virtually nonexistent. Apple had been practically unknown to
Ethiopian farmers until the 1990s, when a Pentecostal church as well as World Vision, a
global NGO with an Evangelical Christian mission, started to promote it in Chencha
town, after which it spread quickly into the rural hinterlands (Freeman 2012; Alemu, van
Kempen, and Ruben forthcoming). Apple orchards in Chencha district are estimated to
cover 728 ha out of a total area of 37,650 ha (Fetena et al. 2014). With average annual
rainfall of 1100–1300 mm and a mean annual temperature around 17°C (min. 11°C to
max. 23°C), agroclimatic conditions are generally suitable for the production of various
varieties of apple. Apple production has in fact become the main source of cash income
for the highlanders, as they have fewer options for cash crops available than lowlanders.
However, proﬁtability varies substantially across apple-cultivating households in the
district, in part due to the different endowment of land and livestock (manure being
an important input for apple production), and partly due to asymmetry in technical
know-how (Alemu, van Kempen, and Ruben 2017).
According to the zonal and district-level women and youth ofﬁces, the government ran-
domly selected various districts of the Southern Region to pilot group-based empowerment
initiatives in 2010, one of these being Chencha. The program has been rolled out in three sub-
districts (kebeles): Mafona Zolo, Doko Kale, and Dorze Hayzo. Women above 18 years of
age in these pilot villages were organized into groups that participate in selected business
activities of their interest with limited support from the government. Some of these groups
picked up fruit and vegetable cultivation business as their preferred choice. In line with the
SHG model, the groups do not only concentrate on cultivation as such, but also engage in
training on women’s rights, education, health, and microﬁnance. In order to isolate the
impact of these SGHs on its members, we selected two out of the three program villages,
i.e., Doko Kale and Mafona Zolo, as apple cultivation was chosen as collective economic
activity in both, but not in Dorze Hayzo. The latter would also make a poor cultural ﬁt, as
it is one of the few communities inhabited by the rather distinct Dorze ethnic group.
Within the two selected kebeles, a criterion for inclusion in the sample was that a member
also engaged in apple cultivation as a household activity before the setup of the SHG
schemes. As a reference group for these SHGmembers, we rejected the idea of sampling con-
trols from nonparticipating households in the program villages, because of potential selection
and spillover effects. Instead, two adjacent kebeles, Doko Tsida and Elena Chare, were pur-
posively selected as control areas, as they had not been selected as a pilot area for the SHG
scheme and were singled out by agricultural ofﬁcers in the district as important centers of pro-
duction and marketing of apple. Again, inclusion in the sample was conditional on being
engaged in apple cultivation at the household level to allow for a meaningful comparison.
Unfortunately, reliable population statistics and SHG membership lists proved nonavail-
able, precluding standard sample size calculations. The latest population census dates from
2007, which in fact extrapolates from data collected in 1994. These data put the total popu-
lation in each of the four selected kebeles between 1500 and 2000 individuals. A back-of-
the-envelope calculation, assuming that a household consists of 7 members on average,
would imply around 1000 adult women residing in this set of kebeles. However, the
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requirement of household apple cultivation reduces the size of the sampling frame consider-
ably, albeit with marked differences across villages within a given kebele. Therefore, we
settled for villages with relatively high incidence of apple cultivation in both treatment and
control kebeles. This resulted in the treatment group in villages with high rates of SHG par-
ticipation as well, which further minimizes the inﬂuence of potential selection effects.
Overall, 209 SHG members were presented with a questionnaire, which was adminis-
tered face-to-face by native-language surveyors. Since the attitudes of male members in
the household hold important clues as to the achievements in the domain of women’s
empowerment, husbands were also interviewed. Sections of the survey that concerned
questions about the household as such were administered to the couple in each other’s pres-
ence. Spouses were taken apart, however, for the attitudinal questions, so as to ensure a
certain degree of privacy. Seventeen women were either single or widowed and were even-
tually dropped from the sample. Hence, the focus is on intra-household dynamics among
married couples only. This leaves a total sample of 192 couples, almost equally split
between treated (94) and untreated (98) ones. Table 1 provides an overview of the
survey sample composition. In addition to the survey, two focus group discussions were
held, one with 10 SHG participants and the other with the same number of nonparticipants.
Also, six key informant interviews were conducted, among which the women ofﬁce heads
at district and zonal level.
5. Identiﬁcation Strategy
The impact of SHG participation on women empowerment has been analyzed using a
“with–without” comparison with PSM. In this setup, the average effect of SHG partici-
pation is assessed on selected empowerment measures, recorded from both spouses, as
outcome variables (Y ). The impact of treatment on individual i, di is the difference
between potential outcomes with and without treatment, coded as 1 and 0, respectively:
di = (Y1i − Y0i).
It follows that the average treatment effect (ATE) is estimated by the following
expression:
ATE = E(di) = E(Y1 − Y0).
Table 1. Composition of sample, by treatment status
Kebele (subdistrict) Cluster village(s)
No. of married
couples
interviewed
Treatment
Doko Kale Pinsa Gitora 44
Mafona Zolo Chilashe 50
Total treatment 94
Control
Elena Chare Kale, Dosha 47
Doko Tsida Warto, Tsida Shaye,
Sharpo
51
Total control 98
Total sample 192
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However, comparing a treatment group with a nonexperimental comparison group can
bias the impact due to self-selection into the program in the absence of random placement.
An instrumental variables technique would offer a potential workaround for selection bias
in our case, but no instrument could be identiﬁed that is sufﬁciently strong for identiﬁcation
and has intuitive appeal. Alternatively, we rely on a statistical procedure that matches obser-
vations in the two groups based on their a priori likelihood of participation (propensity
scores), which has the potential to correct part of the selection bias, i.e., to the extent
that it is caused by variables that have been observed, since it uses a natural weighting
scheme to estimate the treatment impact (Dehejia and Wahba 2002). This notwithstanding,
matching on propensity scores unlikely covers all confounding factors and potentially
worsens the distribution of unobservables between treatment and control (Sainani 2012).
The propensity scores are generated from a probit model that regresses relevant observable
attributes on participation status:
Prob (D = 1|x) =
∫x′b
−1
∅(t)dt = F(x′b).
The functionF(.) is a commonly used notation for the standard normal distribution and x
represents a set of observables that are exogenous to participation (D = 1). The observable
attributes that were used in the regression includes the age and education levels of both
spouses, family size, the religious afﬁliation of the household (Protestant or Orthodox),
whether the woman brought in an asset at the time of marriage, and distance of household
residence to the main road. None of these matching variables should be inﬂuenced by the
SHG intervention.
For setting up the comparison between treatment and control group, each treatment
couple was matched with its ﬁve “nearest neighbors” in terms of the matching variables.
This matching exercise proved successful in the sense that all couples entered into the
common support. Also, Table 2 shows that matching improved the balance between the
two groups in the sample. Without matching, treatment couples feature signiﬁcantly
younger and more educated women, a higher share of Protestants, and fewer women
who brought an asset into their marriage, as compared to the control couples (see
columns 1–3 in Table 2). After matching, the standardized difference between the groups
is lower for all matching variables, except for two that record marginal increases
(columns 5 and 6). The variance ratios reported in columns 7 and 8 tend to be closer to
1, especially regarding the variables which showed large initial disparities, i.e., woman’s
education level and religion. These same variables are also important in explaining the
odds of SHG participation, as shown by the probit regression results in column
4. Younger and more educated women are more likely to join the SHG scheme. Also,
women with a Protestant rather than an Orthodox background show a higher likelihood
of participation, while bringing an asset into one’s marriage signiﬁcantly reduces one’s pro-
pensity to join.
Since PSM eliminates selection bias due to observable factors only, bias may still
persist as a consequence of unobserved variables (Ravallion 2007). When presenting
the average treatment effects on particular outcomes, therefore, we will signal their
respective level of sensitivity to unobservable bias, provided the effects are statistically
signiﬁcant. For this purpose, we use the Mantel–Haenszel bounds procedure for noncon-
tinuous outcome variables to calculate how strongly an unobserved variable should inﬂu-
ence the likelihood of participation through selection in order to invalidate the observed
effect.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics on matched and unmatched sample, by treatment status
Unmatched
Matching
Standardized difference
(T−C) Variance ratio (T−C)
(1) Treatment
(mean) n = 94
(2) Control
(mean) n = 98
(3) Diff
(T−C)
(4) Probit on SHG
participation
(5) Before
matching
(6) After
matching
(7) Before
matching
(8) After
matching
(a) Age woman 40.2 44.9 −4.7
(1.75)***
−0.13
(0.07)*
−0.39 0.09 0.94 1.17
(b) Age husband 48.5 51.7 −3.2
(2.05)
0.03
(0.06)
−0.23 0.07 0.82 1.09
(c) Spousal age gap
(male− female)
8.3 6.9 1.4
(1.14)
-
(d) Education woman
(no. of years)
1.6 0.6 1.0
(0.34)***
0.09
(0.05)*
0.42 0.13 2.57 1.16
(e) Education husband
(no. of years)
4.5 4.3 0.3
(0.61)
−0.04
(0.03)
0.07 −0.13 0.98 1.00
(f) Spousal education gap
(male− female)
3.0 3.7 −0.7
(0.54)
-
(g) Household size
(no. of members)
7.2 7.6 −0.4
(0.33)
−0.01
(0.04)
−0.18 −0.04 1.17 1.49
(h) Religious afﬁliation of
couple (0 = Orthodox;
1 = Protestant)
0.85 0.62 0.23
0.06***
0.83
(0.24)***
0.53 −0.10 0.54 1.11
(i) Woman brought asset to
marriage (0 = no;
1 = yes)
0.36 0.64 −0.28
(0.07)***
−0.69
(0.20)***
−0.58 −0.15 1.01 0.98
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(j) Distance to main road
(in km)
0.85 0.85 0.0
(0.12)
0.10
(0.12)
−0.00 −0.05 1.71 1.41
Likelihood ratio 43.6***
Pseudo R2 0.16
(k) No. of apple trees 31.6 25.3 6.3
(4.58)
(l) Age of apple trees 7.6 7.6 0.0
(0.42)
(m) No. of fruit varieties 5.3 5.5 0.2
(0.34)
(n) No. of seedling varieties 5.2 5.2 0.0
(0.51)
(o) Share of apple in total
household income
0.60 0.55 0.05
(0.04)
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Finally, some remarks are in place regarding the outcome variables used in the impact
analysis. It concerns a set of 13 items that are subjective in nature and are modeled to ques-
tions commonly employed in empirical studies on women empowerment. Perceptions are
elicited regarding women’s involvement in politics and society in general, women’s access
to information and credit, spousal control over household resources, women’s participation
in business, spousal decision-making responsibility, intra-household bargaining power and
acceptance of wife-beating. Out of the 13 items, 10 are 5-point Likert-scale items, either
asking for level of (dis)agreement or, in two cases, for an evaluation of intensity (weak/
strong). The remaining three items are binary (yes/no) questions. See Table 3 for exact
wording of the items and corresponding response scales. It should be noted that scoring
is not consistent in the sense that, for example, higher levels of agreement signal higher
levels in some instances, whereas these point at disempowerment on other items, depending
on positive/negative wording or male/female perspective. Also, the scores across women
and husbands on the same item cannot be interpreted consistently, as some questions ask
both female and male respondents to evaluate women’s position while others request
them to evaluate the situation of the opposite sex. In the results table, we will therefore indi-
cate whether a negative or positive sign on a coefﬁcient implies higher or lower levels of
women empowerment.
6. Results
Before analyzing the impacts of SHG membership, we start out by brieﬂy describing the
experiences of the women who have joined a group. Most of them obtained SHG member-
ship either three or four years before the survey in 2013, which coincides with the original
rollout of the program by the Ethiopian government around 2010. However, one in ﬁve had
been a member for two years only at the time of ﬁeldwork, and a handful even reported
shorter exposure. As for the effort that they invest in collective apple cultivation, the
average member works 20 days per agricultural season on the plots allocated to the
group. About 30% works more, even up to 60 days. By contrast, the most frequently
recorded response is 10 days and some even report contributions as low as 2 or 3 days
per season. Perhaps this variation in labor input explains part of the observed difference
in perceived performance of the group. Roughly one in three rate their group’s overall per-
formance as high, while most others rate it as medium, and only 5% indicate to take part in a
low-performing group. On the distribution of the beneﬁts from the collective enterprise, two
out of three indicate that this is fairly equal, while the other third believe that some members
beneﬁt disproportionally. A similar picture emerges when asked whether members put in
equal effort. A more uniform opinion arises regarding the degree of loyalty that
members display towards the group. Over 90% conﬁrm strong group loyalty, although
this should be qualiﬁed by the fact that 95% prefer to work for their own account rather
than for the group. Still, 9 out of 10 think it is fun to work as a group despite, or
perhaps because, a lot of gossip goes around in their group according to 80% of the
members. Group discipline is deemed important, but not universally. Four out of ﬁve
state that they monitor the quality of each other’s work and feel that those who do not sufﬁ-
ciently contribute should be sanctioned by expulsion from the group. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, high levels of group solidarity are reported. Only 10% of the members
entertain doubts as to whether the group would be willing to help out an individual
member in times of distress, implying that most are conﬁdent that the group will engage
in acts of solidarity.
Changing the scene to their own households, members typically face a husband who is
six years older (median value). The average age gap shown in Table 2 is substantially higher
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics on outcome variables, by treatment status and gender
Women Husbands
(1)
n
(2)
Treatment
(3)
n
(4)
Control
(5)
Diff
(T−C)
(6)
n
(7)
Treatment
(8)
n
(9)
Control
(10)
Diff
(T−C)
(a) Women should be more involved in politics
(1 = strongly disagree, … , 5 = strongly agree)
94 2.7 98 2.0 5.00*** 92 2.7 98 1.8 4.47***
(b) Women should be more involved in civil society
(1 = strongly disagree, … , 5 = strongly agree)
94 3.4 98 2.1 8.52*** 92 2.8 98 2.1 3.49***
(c) Your spouse has the right to control resources
(1 = strongly disagree, … , 5 = strongly agree)
93 3.2 98 3.5 −3.34*** 87 3.2 98 3.4 −1.12
(d) I have good access to information regarding apple cultivation and
marketing
(1 = strongly disagree, … , 5 = strongly agree)
94 2.7 98 2.2 3.52*** 94 3.4 98 2.8 2.87***
(e) I have more power compared to other family members in taking
household decisions
(1 = strongly disagree, … , 5 = strongly agree)
93 2.7 98 2.6 0.67 93 3.1 98 3.0 0.72
(f) Women participate equally in apple business
(1 = strongly disagree, … , 5 = strongly agree)
94 3.6 97 3.4 3.36*** 94 4.6 98 3.1 10.23***
(g) Women have equal access to the resources generated from apple
(1 = strongly disagree, … , 5 = strongly agree)
94 3.6 98 3.3 3.38*** 94 4.3 98 3.4 7.27***
(h) Men take prime responsibility for decision-making
(0 = no; 1 = yes)
94 0.10 98 0.01 2.66*** 92 0.03 98 0.13 −2.48**
(i) To what extent are women free to take their own decisions?
(1 = very weak, … , 5 = very strong)
94 3.0 98 3.2 −1.96* 92 3.4 98 2.3 7.49***
(j) I have more control over household resources than my partner
(1 = strongly disagree, … , 5 = strongly agree)
93 2.2 98 2.6 −2.54** 93 3.1 97 2.9 1.54
(k) Male household member has ﬁnal say regarding decisions on
children’s health
(0 = no; 1 = yes)
94 0.19 98 0.00 4.54*** 92 0.32 98 0.12 3.22***
(l) Is it acceptable for a husband to hit his wife?
(0 = no; 1 = yes)
94 0.53 98 0.17 5.20*** 92 0.56 98 0.55 −0.10
(m) To what extent do women have access to credit?
(1 = very weak, … , 5 = very strong)
94 2.6 98 3.0 −4.91*** 92 2.4 98 2.5 −0.89
*, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
W
om
en
E
m
pow
erm
ent
T
hrough
Self-H
elp
G
roups
321
at 8.3 years, which is due to a few couples showing extreme age gaps of more than 40 years.
Also, husbands tend to be more educated, having had three more years of education on
average. This educational gap is even larger in the control group (3.7 years), which is pri-
marily a consequence of the weak educational proﬁle of the women having been in school
for less than a year on average. However, differences in schooling by treatment status and
by gender should be seen in the light of an abysmal education record overall. Most women
in the sample (78%) have never gone to school and only 1% has completed secondary edu-
cation. Male performance is also underwhelming with an average school career of 4.4 years.
Culturally, a difference can be observed between members and nonmembers in Table 2
with respect to religion. The treatment group has a stronger representation of Protestants,
which includes both Pentecostals and charismatic Evangelists, than the comparator group
(85% against 63%). Orthodox Christians thus constitute a larger share in the latter,
though still a minority. While we have not been able to verify whether cultural or economic
factors are at play, the share of women who brought an asset to the household at the time of
marriage is signiﬁcantly lower in the SHG member group (36% against 64%).
At the bottom of Table 2, indicators of household apple cultivation are compared, which
are remarkably similar across the two groups. The average household owns 25–30 apple
trees of about 7–8 years old and works with ﬁve different varieties of apple fruits and seed-
lings. More crucially, economic dependence on household apple cultivation is in the same
range of 55–60% of total household income.
Now we turn to the impact estimation proper. While Table 3 shows the raw scores on the
13 outcome variables for the treatment and control group, the remainder of this section con-
centrates on the results in Table 4, displaying the average treatment effects on the matched
sample. The number of observations varies slightly across outcomes due to missing values,
but none of the analyses misses out on more than two individuals from the entire sample,
except for the “right to control resources” outcome. The latter has seven missing obser-
vations among males, all husbands of SHG women. The outcomes in Table 4 are organized
from the strongest positive effects at the top of the table to the most pronounced negative
ones at the bottom, as judged from the women’s rather than their husbands’ responses (see
columns 1–6). Taking the women’s perspective on their empowerment, positive effects can
be observed on four outcomes, no effect on three outcomes, and a negative effect on the
remaining six indicators. Comparing the top and bottom of the table reveals that positive
effects concern items that relate to women’s position in the wider community, in case
their involvement in politics and society, and, moreover, have a normative character
(women “should”), whereas the negative effects refer to women’s position in the domestic
sphere and relate more to actual than to desired situations. This difference can be illustrated
by two items that look very similar at ﬁrst; “Your spouse has the right to control resources”
(c) versus “I have more control over household resources than my partner” ( j). The former
features among the positive effects, while the latter contrasts negatively with the responses
in the nonmember group. The “right to” element in the ﬁrst item seems essential, as it indi-
cates that SHG women are less willing to accept male dominance on resource control within
the household, but when actual control over resources is concerned, their perception signals
relative disempowerment compared to the control group. This negative evaluation is likely
rooted in the fact that the mentality of husbands on the issue of resource control appears to
have remained unaffected. They are as likely to claim the right to control resources as hus-
bands in non-SHG areas (see columns 7–12). This offers a sharp contrast with their strong
support for an expansion of women’s “room for maneuver” in public life (items a and b),
which suggests that their sensitization to liberal ideas about women’s position has been
selective and biased towards those aspects that are less threatening, at least in the short
run, to their position as head of household.
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Table 4. Average treatment effects from SHG participation using nearest-neighbor matchinga, and sensitivity to unobservable bias
ATE – women ATE – husbands
(1)
n
(2)a
Coef.
NN
[K]
(3)
AI
Robust
Std. Err.
(4)
p
(5)
WomEmp
Effect
(6)b
Γ
(7)
n
(8)a
Coef.
NN
[K]
(9)
AI
Robust
Std. Err.
(10)
p
(11)
WomEmp
Effect
(12)b
Γ
(a) Women should be more involved in politics 192 0.52
0.50
0.12 0.000*** +ve 5.1 190 0.67
0.65
0.15 0.00*** +ve 4.3
(b) Women should be more involved in civil
society
192 1.19
1.14
0.11 0.000*** +ve 20.0 190 0.42
0.48
0.15 0.007*** +ve 4.3
(c) Your spouse has the right to control resources 191 −0.48
−0.49
0.08 0.000*** +ve 5.3 185 −0.12
−0.16
0.10 0.214 0
(d) I have good access to information regarding
apple cultivation and marketing
192 0.35
0.44
0.16 0.035** +ve 1.1 192 0.66
0.68
0.19 0.001*** ? 3.6
(e) I have more power compared to other family
members in taking household decisions
191 0.25
0.28
0.24 0.292 0 191 0.02
−0.08
0.24 0.941 0
(f) Women participate equally in apple business 191 0.10
−0.06
0.16 0.544 0 192 1.54
1.46
0.11 0.000*** +ve n.a.
(g) Women have equal access to the resources
generated from apple
192 −0.01
−0.06
0.22 0.970 0 192 0.71
0.79
0.15 0.000*** +ve 5.4
(h) Men take prime responsibility for decision-
making
192 0.12
0.11
0.06 0.052* −ve 1.3 190 −0.13
−0.12
0.04 0.000*** +ve 1.8
(i) To what extent are women free to take their
own decisions?
192 −0.21
−0.30
0.11 0.048** −ve 3.4 190 1.25
1.24
0.13 0.000*** +ve 9.3
(j) I have more control over household resources
than my partner
191 −0.72
−0.60
0.16 0.000*** −ve 1.4 190 0.33
0.36
0.22 0.133 0
(k) Male household member has ﬁnal say
regarding decisions on children’s health
192 0.18
0.19
0.04 0.000*** −ve 3.1 190 0.12
0.15
0.07 0.106 0
(l) Is it acceptable for a husband to hit his wife? 192 0.36
0.36
0.07 0.000*** −ve 4.0 190 −0.07
−0.04
0.09 0.424 0
(m) To what extent do women have access to
credit?
192 −0.38
−0.44
0.09 0.000*** −ve 5.5 190 −0.04
−0.06
0.13 0.767 0
aBased on matching with ﬁve nearest neighbors using teffects psmatch command in STATA14 (NN). As a robustness check, ATE coefﬁcient generated by Kernel
matching using psmatch2 command is provided in italics [K ].
bGamma at which result loses signiﬁcance at 10%, using Mantel–Haenszel bounds. In one case (f), sensitivity could not be computed due to nonparametric nature of the
bounds calculation.
*, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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In this line of reasoning, however, it is somewhat puzzling that husbands, compared to
their counterparts in the control group, are more likely to perceive women as participating
equally in apple cultivation ( f ) and having equal access to resources generated from apple
cultivation (g), grant them more freedom to take their own decisions (i), and seem willing to
shift some responsibility for decision-making to their partner (h). Strikingly, women show
particularly poor evaluations of these same items (h and i), or at least no better than non-
members ( f and g). On other counts, the attitude of male respondents is indistinguishable
from those in the control group, such as where it concerns having a ﬁnal say on decisions
regarding children’s health (k), tolerance of wife-beating (l ), and women’s access to credit
(m). On each of these three items, SHG women seem particularly frustrated, reporting sig-
niﬁcantly less empowering outcomes than nonmembers (bottom three entries in Table 4).
The fact that they signal a higher tolerance among husbands to engage in physical abuse
vis-à-vis their spouse is particularly worrying.
The effects described above appear rather strong. Out of 10 signiﬁcant effects on
women’s attitudes (column 4), 7 reach signiﬁcance at the 1% level (3 positive and 4 nega-
tive). Note that we disregard the positive effect on male access to information (column 10),
which is highly signiﬁcant, but does not have a clear relation with women empowerment.
Moreover, all six (positive) effects observed on male attitudes are signiﬁcant at 1% as well.
In order to check whether the results are sensitive to the matching procedure applied
(nearest neighbors with replacement), columns (2) and (8) of Table 4 also report coefﬁcients
estimated using Kernel matching (in italics). This alternative produces very similar results,
both qualitatively as well as in magnitude. The largest difference is observed on women’s
perception regarding equal participation of both spouses in apple business. SHG women
observe lower equality when compared to non-SHG women using Kernel matching, but
not signiﬁcantly so.
Sensitivity to unobservable bias, as reﬂected in the critical values for gamma (columns 6
and 12), is reportedly low for most effects. When gamma = 2.0, for example, unobservables
should at least double the probability of SHG membership in order to undermine the sig-
niﬁcance of the observed effect. Except for three cases, the values for gamma exceed
2.0. The more sensitive ones include spouses’ relative control over household resources
( j), primacy of responsibility for decision-making (h), and women’s access to information
on apple technology (d ). The latter is the weakest in this regard. An unobserved factor that
would change the likelihood of SHG participation by 10% could invalidate the positive
effect.
7. Discussion
The general impression that emerges from Table 4 is that SHG members are more aware of
their subordinate position vis-à-vis male members of society and feel an urge to challenge
this, both within and outside their household. However, husbands of SHG members seem to
support such demand for more agency almost exclusively in the public domain, which
suggests that empowerment gains from SHGs are concentrated at the community level.
Our focus group discussion with members conﬁrms that women have started to share
more information among each other and that, as a collective, they increasingly became a
force to reckon with in the community. It is also this broader role that the Ethiopian govern-
ment stressed in its intervention model. For instance, the government uses SHGs to advo-
cate educational and health-related issues within the groups and, by extension, to other
women in the village. The SHG women revealed during the focus group discussion that
they advise their fellow women to implement the health packages (like hygiene, family
planning, delivery at health stations, prevention and control of common diseases in the
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locality) and promote the enrollment of school-age children. They claim that due to their
actions, the awareness of women in the community on health and educational beneﬁts
has been raised from a very low base some years ago. They also stimulate other women
to participate in community meetings and women SHG activities in spite of resistance
encountered from spouses and village ofﬁcials. They also pointed out that groups even
go to households where husbands mistreat their wives to offer advice and put pressure
on the men. Since men anticipate that they will be approached by the SHG members in
case of mistreating their spouses, violence against women has reportedly diminished.
Another piece of qualitative evidence in support of positive community-wide impacts con-
cerns the domain of education. The women mentioned that they used to send their boys to the
capital Addis Ababa to work in weaving, in exchange for an annual ﬁnancial compensation
for the parents, but that this practice has nowadays been abandoned under pressure from
SHGs. The boys that were sent out as child laborers currently attend school, avoiding the per-
nicious impact of exploitation in the labor market on their short- and long-term welfare. The
halt to this practice might even break an important intergenerational channel of poverty trans-
mission. The women cooperate with the village administration and participate in committees
that control child trafﬁcking. Moreover, coming together as a group has the beneﬁt that they
share information among themselves which increases their understanding about their rights,
the rules of the community and the state, business opportunities, and the problems which
affect individuals and the community at large.
While the collective action against child labor and marital violence inﬂuences important
decisions at the household level, our results at the same time suggest that SHGs may have
had a perverse impact on the perceived bargaining power of women in the domestic sphere.
This could tentatively be attributed to increased awareness of the power imbalance among
women, increasing their frustration as long as the status quo is maintained. However, the
focus group discussion and key informant interviews revealed that both open and tacit
resistance from men may also have played a part. Especially in the start-up phase of the
groups, opposition from husbands was so strong that a number of women who showed
up for some time for SHG meetings soon stopped attending. More subtle forms of male
assertiveness would include a tightening of their grip on the family’s apple business. If
this holds true more widely, it would be consistent with the observation that spouses enter-
tain different views on the degree to which spouses participate in, and beneﬁt from, apple
cultivation. If husbands’ objective is to keep a check on their wives’ control on household
resources, they would factor in the additional income that women obtain from the SHG
enterprise and restore the balance by capturing increased control on the household business.
In their view, the two would then be “equal” again. From the female perspective, however,
this likely feels as a loss, as established claims on household income are eroded, despite the
fact that SHGs allow them to tap into a new source of income.
Notwithstanding the limitations of our cross-sectional design, which only offers a “snap-
shot” and thus does not warrant strong causal claims, our results best ﬁt a scenario in which
SHG membership puts pressure on spousal relations and, possibly, upsets the quasi-coop-
erative model, albeit a strongly male-biased one, in order to give way to a noncooperative
bargaining model. In this light, it is interesting to consider one of the SHG women from the
focus group discussion, who recalled that when they began planting apple seedlings in their
own backyard in the past, spouses tended to ignore or even discourage these efforts. When
the product was ready for commercialization, however, they decided to involve anyway and
take the produce to the market. In the SHG case, husbands do not have the option to co-opt
women’s initiatives, as it is a space reserved for the women’s group only, which makes the
household business vulnerable to becoming a “battleground” for spousal control instead.
Women Empowerment Through Self-Help Groups 325
8. Conclusion
The paper evaluated the impact of women SHG participation on a set of empowerment out-
comes, most of which related to intra-household aspects, but others indicating levels of
empowerment at community level. Based on cross-sectional data collected from 192
apple-producing women and corresponding husbands from four subdistricts in the
Chencha district of Southern Ethiopia, a scenario emerged in which SHG membership
effectively supports empowerment of women at the community level, which is strongly
supported by husbands as well, but in which such empowerment gains do not translate
into the household domain. If anything, spousal relations appear to have been strained
due to stronger male assertiveness in restoring control. Framed differently, women seem
to have gained “power with” but did not improve on, or possibly even lost out on,
“power to” and “power over” (cf. Pereznieto and Taylor 2014). Our results from the
female subsample are consistent with a male backlash effect, even though husbands do
not seem to admit as such, or are unaware of their assertiveness in exercising control.
Overall, the picture that we obtain is less reassuring than the distinct positive “average”
outcome reported by Brody et al. (2017) in their global, but markedly South Asia-biased,
systematic review. While the above scenario needs further scrutiny, preferably in a panel
study that would be able to capture the effects from increasing economic returns in
SHGs as apple trees mature, a tentative explanation for this outlier case may be found in
the choice for women-only collective apple cultivation alongside family-based apple
growing. Apple cultivation was already governed by gendered norms about resource
control and distribution, and the introduction of women-only cultivation could have
upended this “model” and have triggered defensive instincts among husbands as a
consequence.
While acknowledging that the results obtained could be highly context-speciﬁc, either
driven by Gamo-speciﬁc cultural traits and/or distinct economic features of the Ethiopian
highlands, our ﬁndings speak to results obtained elsewhere in East Africa. For instance,
Manzanera-Ruiz and Lizarraga (2016) study reasons of (non)participation in informal
women’s groups of tomato production in Soni, Tanzania. Their qualitative work signaled
that one of the reasons for not joining a women group was to secure their (secondary)
claim on income from home production of tomatoes, which is male-dominated but
where women contribute in irrigation and harvesting tasks (101). Similar tactics have
been reported for women avoiding engagement with water groups in the Kenyan highlands
(Were, Roy, and Swallow 2008). The authors discredit the idea that women are simply sub-
missive to male dominance, but rather calculate the net beneﬁt of participation taking into
account an anticipated male backlash. More evidence is provided in a study of SHGs in
coffee production in Uganda, where some husbands gained membership into SHGs that
were initially female-only (Meier zu Selhausen and Stam 2013). This led to increased
male assertiveness in claiming income from coffee and less spousal cooperation in
general. A follow-up study on the same case makes clear that joint home production of
coffee is susceptible to capture by men, “as 24 percent of wives sold unprocessed coffee
at a lower price (to private buyers) to avoid their husband ‘stealing’ the coffee” (Meier
zu Selhausen 2016, 143). More systematic evidence for Uganda is available outside the
agricultural sector. A large-scale cluster-randomized trial of a program offering $150
business grants to women in two northern districts ﬁnds increased controlling behavior
on the part of husbands in households of beneﬁciary women, as “women assigned to the
treatment reported having to give money to their partner more frequently and that their part-
ners had taken money against their will” (Green et al. 2015, 185).
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Another possible concern regarding the transferability of our ﬁndings lies in the fact that
the economic activity of the women SHG is the same as the one that spouses perform
jointly. While it is hard to estimate the likelihood of such as scenario, it has recently
been acknowledged that it is misguided to consider agriculture in sub-Sahara Africa as a
duality between female-managed and male-managed plots, which is common in research
on gender disparities in agricultural productivity, for example. As Doss (2018, 46)
reminds us, “most farming takes place in households in which men and women share
responsibility for the same plots and for the whole of the household enterprise.” The
broader message, therefore, is that the selection of a particular economic activity in
SHGs that aim for collective income generation is more complex than “only” taking into
account market feasibility, interest of the women concerned, and the required level of
skills and experience. Anticipation on the interaction of the SHG business with economic
activities employed as an individual or as a family is important to avoid a potential back-
lash. Even if the negative impacts experienced by SHG members prove transitory, or
perhaps even a necessary condition for a “deep” transformation of women’s status in
society, it would still be worthwhile to make an ex ante risk assessment in order to allow
for better expectations management. Further research into how SHG activities and house-
hold enterprises “communicate” in terms of shifting or undermining “family norms” (cf.
Van Staveren and Ode bode 2007) would also help to understand why backlash effects
are triggered in some settings, but not in others.
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